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This paper investigates potential bias in awards of player disciplinary sanctions, in the
form of cautions (yellow cards) and dismissals (red cards) by referees in the English Premier
League and the Bundesliga. Previous studies of behaviour of soccer referees have not adequately
incorporated within-game information. Descriptive statistics from our samples clearly show that
home teams receive fewer yellow and red cards than away teams. But biases may be wrongly
identified where the modeller has failed to include within-game events such as goals scored and
recent cards issued. What appears as referee favouritism may actually be excessive and illegal
aggressive behaviour by players in teams that are behind in score. We deal with these issues
using a minute-by-minute bivariate probit analysis of yellow and red cards issued in games over
six seasons in the two leagues. The significance of a variable to denote score difference at the
time of sanction suggests that excessive effort, induced by a losing position, is an important
influence on award of yellow and red cards. Controlling for a number of pre-game and
within-game variables, we find evidence of home team favouritism in Germany as home teams
with running tracks in their stadia attract more yellow and red cards than teams playing in stadia
with separation of fans from pitch. This is indicative of referee response to social pressure.
Separating the competing teams in matches by favourite and underdog status, as perceived by the
betting market, yields further evidence, this time for both leagues, that the source of home teams
receiving fewer cards is not just that they are disproportionately often the favoured team. 
Rather, there appears to be pure referee bias in relative treatments of home and away teams.
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“It was like playing against 12 men”- Sir Alex Ferguson on the performance of referee Herbert 
Fandel after Manchester United’s 2-1 defeat, away to Roma in a UEFA Champions’ League 






In professional soccer, referees are appointed to regulate matches under the Laws of Association 
Football, which are determined by the governing body of world soccer, FIFA. In applying these 
laws referees have sanctions in the form of cautions (henceforth ‘yellow cards’) and expulsions 
of players from the field (‘red cards’). Although yellow cards are issued for less heinous 
offences, such as dissent, deliberate handball, persistent fouling, obstruction and shirt-pulling, 
this sanction offers an important disincentive to persist in illegal behaviour as a second caution to 
the same player is accompanied by dismissal (‘second yellow card’). A red card results from 
serious misconduct such as hitting a player or a dangerous tackle or the so-called ‘professional 
foul’ where a player deliberately prevents a clear goal-scoring opportunity for an opponent by 
unfair means. Red cards are relatively infrequent.  
 
Fans, players and head coaches worldwide often complain about both inconsistent application of 
rules by referees and alleged bias against their team. Critical refereeing decisions can be pivotal 
for a team’s prospects of winning championships, qualifying for lucrative European competition 
or avoiding relegation. As revenue streams, especially sales of broadcast rights, have grown in 
European football, so criticism of referee behaviour has intensified. This has begun to be 
reflected in academic research and a number of papers have investigated particular sources of  3
bias, inconsistency and favouritism offered by football referees in various European leagues, 
including England, Germany and Spain. 
 
One strand of literature examines the amounts of time added on by referees at the end of each 
half of games. Referees will stop their clocks immediately if they perceive a player to be 
sufficiently injured to warrant treatment on the field. They also receive official guidance on 
amounts of time to add on for substitutions and are instructed to resist attempts at timewasting, 
with cautions if necessary. But the referee takes sole responsibility for time-keeping and does 
have some discretion over amounts of time played. An influential paper by Garicano et al. 
(2005) presented evidence from the Spanish top division that referees awarded less added time 
after 90 minutes in games where the home team was ahead and more added time when the home 
team was behind. These results were obtained after controlling for numbers of substitutions, 
cautions and injuries that would tend to interrupt a match. Subsequently, other authors offered 
broad support for home team favouritism in terms of added time. Lucey and Power (2005) were 
able to replicate the results of Garicano et al. for Italian and US Major League Soccer. Dohmen 
(2005) and Sutter and Kocher (2004) found that Bundesliga referees added more time on in 
games where the home team was behind.  
 
Dohmen strengthened the findings of referee bias by also investigating ‘disputable’ and 
‘incorrect’ decisions as determined by an independent panel of consultants (appointed by the 
German Football Federation, DFB) after matches. It appeared that home teams were more likely 
to benefit from disputable or incorrect goals and penalties awarded. Intriguingly, though, bias 
was more evident in grounds where a running track did not separate crowd from pitch. Referees  4
did not offer superfluous extra time in grounds with running tracks and this suggests that the 
extent and effectiveness of social pressure on referees depends on stadium design. 
The supposed mechanism is that referees respond (presumably subconsciously) to the 
preferences of the crowd when the physical proximity of the crowd is close. 
  
Another strand of literature examines impacts of changes in the rules of the game and referees’ 
contractual status on award of sanctions. In the 1998/99 season, FIFA issued a toughened rule on 
dangerous tackles by stipulating that a deliberate tackle made from behind an opponent should be 
punished by a red card. The principle behind this rule change was that defenders had been 
making such tackles in an intimidatory manner and that attackers henceforth would be less 
constrained in their forward moves. FIFA felt that the rule change would deter defenders and 
might contribute to more attacking play, with presumed benefits in terms of greater gate 
attendance and TV audiences. Witt (2005) found, looking at the 1997/98 and 1998/99 English 
Premiership seasons, that, after the rule change was imposed, the number of red cards did not 
increase but the number of yellow cards did. This suggests that the rule change acted as an 
effective deterrent to illegal tackles but also players tended to substitute more minor yellow card 
offences for red card offences. In North America, Allen (2002), Heckelman and Yates (2002) 
and Levitt (2002) examined the case of the National Hockey League where two referees, rather 
than one, were randomly assigned to games in a season. Both sets of authors found that a higher 
number of referees was not associated with a reduction in the number of fouls. But as Witt 
(2005) notes, it does not follow that deterrence theory is rejected in this case. The number of 
fouls recorded depends on the behaviour of both players and officials. With more policemen, as 
many crimes as before may be noticed even if fewer are committed.  5
In 2001/02 another significant change occurred in English football, this time involving referees’ 
terms of employment rather than the Laws of the Game. In contrast to all other European 
leagues, the English Premiership changed its referee reward system away from a match fee (plus 
expenses) and towards a full-time salary. A Premiership list was devised of top referees who 
would earn this salary. In exceptional cases of poor performance, a referee could be demoted 
from this list and replaced, but generally the referee panel was renewed and set at the beginning 
of each season. The rationale for this new payment scheme was that referees would become 
‘more professional’. Released from the pressures of work in their regular occupation, referees 
could train with Premiership teams, become fitter and take part in fuller discussion with peers 
(and clubs) over aspects of recent performance. The intended effects of annual salary contracts 
were to reduce bias and inconsistency among ‘professional’ referees. Rickman and Witt (2005) 
examined discretionary time added on by referees at the end of English Premiership games and 
found evidence of home team bias in the 1999/2000 season; but in the 2002/03 season, after the 
change in contract, this bias was removed. They interpret this result as suggesting that the 
incentives built into annual salary contracts were sufficient to remove this particular form of 
bias. However, this finding is based on only one season’s data subsequent to the change. 
 
A small number of papers directly address sources and extent of referee bias. Dawson et al. 
(2007) offer a comprehensive analysis of various possible forms of referee bias in the English 
Premiership covering seven seasons. Whereas Witt (2005) focuses on total cautions and 
dismissals in games, regardless of whether the perpetrators are from home or away team, 
Dawson et al. distinguish between home and away team cautions and dismissals in a bivariate 
negative binomial model. They do this by amalgamating yellow and red cards into a discrete  6
points measure. Although the results from the yellow cards regression are stated to be similar to 
those from the points measure, they do not offer an explicit separate analysis of yellow and red 
card offences. Their findings are indicative of bias in favour of home teams (fewer cards given to 
home teams, more cards awarded to away teams, after controlling for relative team strengths and 
importance of fixtures for league outcomes). Supporting evidence of referee bias in favour of 
home teams is offered by Boyko et al. (2007). They examine yellow card awards and penalty 
decisions in 5244 Premiership games and find that there was inconsistent and favourable 
treatment of home teams across the 50 referees considered.  
 
The literature on sanctions and penalties reviewed so far uses the match as unit of observation 
and this raises issues about controlling for within-game effects. The award of sanctions will most 
likely depend on the dynamics of previous sanctions; casual inspection of the data suggests that 
yellow cards tend to be clustered in groups close together in time, so award of one card is 
followed by award of another. This is arguably a consequence both of a rising temperature of a 
game in which illegal activity escalates and of increased monitoring as referees try to retain 
control of the match. Also, it is clear that the incidence of yellow cards is greater for away teams 
than for home teams. This is not necessarily attributable to referee bias. Home teams have home 
advantage, a feature that is prominent in most major team sports. Consequently, away teams are 
generally expected to defend more than home teams because, typically, the phenomenon of home 
advantage makes them underdogs (see Carmichael and Thomas (2005) for a study of home 
advantage in English football; Pollard and Pollard (2005) and Stefani (2007) survey the extent of 
home advantage in team sports across North America and England). This extra emphasis on 
defence often spills over into illegal activity.   7
An additional factor is that teams that are behind in score may resort to more physical play in 
order to get back on even terms and this too may result in illegal aggression. This will generate 
more cards for away teams in the aggregate than for home teams in the aggregate because away 
teams are more frequently behind in a game than are home teams. Failure to control for within-
game dynamics, especially the goal difference prior to a card being issued, leaves investigators 
open to omitted variable bias and mistaken inferences over extent of bias. What is attributed as 
referee bias may simply result from excessive effort by the offending teams. Away teams may 
receive more yellow cards in the aggregate just because, on average, they spend more of the 
game trailing their opponents in score and therefore resort to more foul play.  
 
Our contribution to the study of referee bias in European football departs from the existing 
literature in two key respects. First, acknowledging the potential importance of within-game 
dynamics noted above, we switch from match to minute of game as unit of observation. Rather 
than model the number of cautions and dismissals as count variables (as in Witt, 2005 and 
Dawson et al., 2007), we model the probability of a caution or dismissal within a specific minute 
of a match. This permits us to introduce a full set of relevant within-game covariates such as 
number of yellow and red cards issued up to the minute and score difference at the start of the 
minute. Specifically, we set up a bivariate probit model in which the likelihood of a card being 
issued is determined for home and away teams jointly. Our second innovation is to compare 
results from two leagues over the same time period. The literature to date reads as a set of cases, 
with one league analysed at a time. Here, we make a direct comparison of yellow and red cards 
for the English Premiership and the Bundesliga. Our sample period covers the 2000/01 to 
2005/06 seasons and over this time there were no radical changes in the rules of football.  8
2.  DATA AND MODEL 
 
We propose two pairs of dependent variables. The first pair comprises binary indicators of the 
award of a specific type of card to home and away teams in a given minute of a match. We 
estimate probability of a card being awarded, focussing on the Bundesliga. Unlike the 
Premiership, some Bundesliga stadia have running tracks separating crowd from pitch. 
Following Dohmen (2005), we hypothesise that social pressure on referees will decrease when a 
track is present. We construct a dummy variable, track, to capture presence of a running track in 
a stadium. Then, the hypothesis to be tested is that home teams have lower probability of receipt 
of a card and/or away teams have a higher probability of receipt of a card when a track is present. 
Data on tracks in stadia, kindly provided by Joachim Prinz of Witten/Herdecke University, show 
that the number of team-seasons with tracks is 39 out of 108. Three teams actually changed their 
ground structure during our sample period. Schalke, in 2001, and Bayern Munich, in 2005, 
moved to a new stadium without a running track. Hannover, in 2003, renovated their old 
stadium, removing the existing running track. Hence, track is not conflated with team-specific 
effects and does permit identification of favourable treatment by referees.  
 
The second pair of dependent variables consists of probability of a card being awarded to 
favourite and underdog teams, as assessed by the bookmaker betting market for match results. 
We can address the issue of home team bias directly by modelling the probability that a team 
will be awarded a yellow card in the next minute of a match with a specific dummy variable 
included to reflect whether a team is home or away. Of course, this requires a departure from 
defining the two teams in a match as the home club and the away club: for each equation to be  9
estimated, there has to be a mix of home and away teams in each subsample if a home dummy is 
to be included. Accordingly we need to adopt an alternative perspective on each match from that 
taken earlier. A convenient dichotomy is between teams that were favourites or underdogs in the 
betting market.  A small number of matches had equal win probabilities for the two teams (i.e. 
there was no favourite) and these games were excluded from the sample. 
 
As noted above, the use of minute of game as unit of observation allows us to control for within-
game influences on award of yellow cards. We have data on times of yellow and red cards and 
goals scored for the English Premiership and Bundesliga 1 obtained from www.11v11.co.uk and 
www.bundesliga.de. The former site offers identity of referee. In general, the two sites offer 
consistency in timing of cards and goals although www.bundesliga.de is more comprehensive in 
its coverage of German cards. This site does have a peculiar feature in that it records minute zero 
as the beginning and minute 89 as the end of a match. We added one minute on for each card and 
goal taken from the German site to provide consistency with the English data. There are 
occasions where more than one card is issued to the same team in a particular minute and, when 
that happens, we simply record ‘one’; there is therefore an extent to which this recording of cards 
slightly understates the total.  
 
Our sources permit us to separate the data into yellow card, second yellow card and red card 
categories. Table 1 below shows some descriptive statistics for yellow cards, red cards and 
second yellow cards by referee for the two leagues in our study. Clearly, yellow cards occur 
much more frequently than red cards. The rarity of dismissals, relative to cautions, is itself a 
consequence of incentives. When a player receives a red card, his team plays with 10 men and  10
some literature shows that teams with 11 men have a greater chance of winning against 10 men 
compared to 11, although this depends on the timing of dismissal and hence how much time 
there is left for the team with full strength to exploit its advantage (Ridder et al., 1994, Torgler, 
2004, Caliendo and Radic, 2006). If the depleted team loses the game then the dismissed player 
may receive blame from fans and coaches for the defeat (in press conferences head coaches 
sometimes speak of ‘unnecessary dismissal’ when a player performs a reckless act that induces a 
red card). Unless the dismissal is found to be unfair on appeal, the player will also serve a 
suspension (of a minimum of three games for a straight red card) and may receive a fine if the 
offence was very serious. The suspension has career implications for the player in that a 
replacement may claim and retain the player’s place, even when the suspended player becomes 
available again. As a result, the kind of severe offences found in amateur football, such as 
fighting between players, are far less prevalent in the professional game.    
 
We distinguish between control variables for within-game and pre-game influences. In the 
former category, we include minute and minute squared as covariates since it appears that the 
longer the match continues, the more likely it is that a card will be issued. Also, we should note 
that neither web site records time added on at the end of each half and so the 45
th and 90
th 
minutes will typically last longer than others because they include ‘injury time’. We account for 
this feature of the data by using dummy variables, 45
th minute and 90
th minute. The dynamics of 
previous yellow cards are included by separating numbers of cards issued to home and away 
teams in the preceding three minutes  (home yellow cards last 3, away yellow cards last 3) from 
numbers of cards issued earlier in the game than the preceding three minutes (home yellow cards 
prior, away yellow cards prior). Numbers of straight red cards (without previous yellow) issued  11
in the game prior to the subject minute are captured by home red and away red. Numbers of 
second yellow cards issued previously in the match are similarly captured by home 2
nd yellow 
and away 2
nd yellow. The impacts of these within-game dynamic effects cannot be signed a 
priori. On the one hand, an extra card issued in the preceding three minutes, or prior to that, to a 
team may reduce the probability of a further card being issued to the same team, a deterrence 
effect. On the other hand, an extra card in the previous three minutes may be part of an escalation 
in illegal conflict between teams and so the sign of effect on probability of a card in the present 
minute may then be positive. Observers sometimes claim that referees have a tendency to ‘even 
out’ decisions so that a caution given to one team is followed by another to its opponent, but we 
are unable to distinguish this from conflict escalation generated by the players themselves. Our 
set of variables covering previous yellow and red cards serves to control for dynamics of conflict 
during a game.  
 
Illegal activity may also increase as teams fall behind and we register the goal difference as 
match status (home team current score minus away team current score) at any point in time. 
Teams that are behind in score, which are more often away than home teams, are hypothesised to 
generate extra effort in an effort to negate the deficit and some of this extra effort will spill over 
into illegal activity, punishable by cautions or dismissals. This illegal effort is characterised by 
Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2006) as ‘sabotage in tournaments’, where players attempt to 
reduce the effectiveness of opponents by unfair means. The propensity to undertake sabotage 
activity will be enhanced for a team that is behind in score. 
  12
Some football matches are notable for the intense rivalry they generate amongst supporters and 
players, the result of tradition and independent of current team league standings and prospects. 
These matches are generally played between two local teams a short distance apart. Witt (2005) 
used distance between (stadia of) competing teams to capture the impact of local rivalry. Here 
we nominate a particular set of rivalrous games denoted by derby and predict that these will 
generate a higher probability of a caution or dismissal for each team. In Germany, there is 
typically much greater average distance between teams than in England and so there are far 
fewer local derbies to be found in the Bundesliga, which has just six team pairs following the list 
provided by Brandes and Franck (2007).    
 
The extent of social pressure exerted by fans may be positively related to size of crowd and we 
proxy crowd intensity by (log) match attendance (log attendance). Dawson et al. (2007) use this 
measure as a covariate in their analysis of disciplinary points.  
 
We also include a measure of ex ante relative team strength. Dawson et al. used an elaborate 
forecasting model to generate win probabilities for the respective teams in a match. An 
alternative is to derive a relative team strength measure from betting odds. This has the 
advantage that odds will incorporate not only information from previous matches, as in the 
statistical model, but also fresh news such as that pertaining to player absences from injury or 
suspension. Of course, reliance on bookmaker odds to capture relative team strengths (as 
modified by home advantage) depends on the betting market being efficient. In the sample 
period employed by Dawson et al., there is evidence that it was not fully so (Forrest and 
Simmons, 2002) and a statistical model may indeed have been a more appropriate basis for  13
deriving win probabilities. However, since the abolition of betting tax in 2001, and as the growth 
of internet competition has put pressure on bookmaker margins, there is evidence (Forrest and 
Simmons, 2004) that the betting market has moved strongly towards displaying efficiency, i.e. 
towards odds capturing accurately all factors relevant to the outcome of a match. Accordingly we 
choose to exploit odds data, from Ladbrokes, the largest UK bookmaker, and include in our 
model difference in bookmaker probability (home win probability minus away win probability) 
and, to capture non-linearity, its square. This variable proxies ex ante relative team strengths. 
The larger the value of this variable, the stronger the relative strength of the home side and, we 
predict, the less (more) likely the home (away) team is to be awarded yellow cards.      
 
Armed with this set of covariates we model home and away  probabilities of receipt of yellow 
(red) card as: 
 
Probability of home team yellow (red) = f( minute, minute squared, 45
th minute, 90
th minute, 
home yellow cards last 3 minutes, away yellow cards last 3 minutes, home yellow cards prior, 
away yellow cards prior, (home 2
nd yellow), (away 2
nd yellow), home red, away red, goal 
difference, track, log attendance, derby, difference in bookmaker probability, difference in 
bookmaker probability squared)         ( 1 )  
 
Probability of away team yellow (red) = f( minute, minute squared, 45
th minute, 90
th minute, 
home cards last 3 minutes, away cards last 3 minutes, home cards prior, away cards prior, home 
2
nd yellow), (away 2
nd yellow) home red, away red, goal difference, track, log attendance, derby, 
difference in bookmaker probability, difference in bookmaker probability squared) (2)  14
 
We model favourite and underdog probabilities as: 
 
Probability of favourite team yellow (red) = f( minute, minute squared, 45
th minute, 90
th minute, 
favourite yellow cards last 3 minutes, underdog yellow cards last 3 minutes, favourite yellow 
cards prior, underdog yellow cards prior, home 2
nd yellow, away 2
nd yellow, home red, away 
red, goal difference, home underdog, derby, difference in bookmaker probability) (3) 
 
Probability of underdog team yellow (red) = f( minute, minute squared, 45
th minute, 90
th minute, 
favourite yellow cards last 3 minutes, underdog yellow cards last 3 minutes, favourite yellow 
cards prior, underdog yellow cards prior, home 2
nd yellow, away 2
nd yellow, home red, away 
red, goal difference,  home underdog, derby, difference in bookmaker probability)   (4) 
 
In our estimation, we assume independence of error terms across matches but control for 
interdependence of error terms within matches by clustering of residuals. The resulting error 
terms are then robust to heteroskedasticity.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL  RESULTS 
 
We begin with a descriptive analysis of referee propensity to award yellow and red cards in the 
Bundesliga and the Premiership. The matches in our samples were officiated by 35 referees in 
the Bundesliga and 36 referees in the Premiership. Some referees were in charge of small 
numbers of games, just one in some instances. The average number of games officiated is 52 in  15
the Bundesliga and 63 in the Premiership but the difference between the samples is not 
statistically significant. Standard deviations are 36 and 47 respectively. In each league, referees 
are obliged to retire at the age of 48, so our sample includes some referees who had just begun 
careers at the top level and others who retired or were demoted during the sample period. An 
analysis of career duration and referee performance in the Bundesliga is presented by Frick and 
Prinz (2007). 
 
From the data shown in Table 1, and focussing on referees who have officiated at least 25 games, 
we consider the mean number of each type of card for home and away teams. There are two 
immediate results from t-tests, conducted with samples of unequal variance. First, with just one 
exception, referees in each league awarded fewer cards per game to home teams than to away 
teams. This was not necessarily due to referee bias as away teams tend to be more involved in 
defensive play as they struggle to overcome home advantage. The exception noted is straight red 
cards in England where the null hypothesis of equality of cards per game for home and away 
teams is not rejected (p = 0.31). Second, English referees tended to award fewer yellow cards per 
game than their German colleagues, irrespective of whether the team was home or away (p = 
0.00 for both home and away comparisons). For red cards though (and for home team second 
yellow cards) English referees are no less severe than German referees.  Differences in incidence 
of cards across leagues could reflect different degrees of aggression; the industry stereotype is 
that the Premiership is faster-paced, more physical and more attack-oriented than the Bundesliga. 
But differences in interpretation of the Laws of the Game may also play a part. Offences 
meriting straight red cards involve more clear-cut decisions by referees compared to yellow 
cards, where there is greater scope for discretion.  16
In Table 2, bivariate probit estimates of equations (1) and (2) are shown for probability of a 
yellow card, for each league, while Table 3 reports estimates of probability of red card in each 
league. 
  
Our control variables show plausible and important effects from within-game dynamics in both 
leagues. An extra yellow card received by the home (away) team previously in the match, 
whether in the immediately preceding three minutes or prior to that, is associated with reduced 
probability of a home (away) team yellow card in the current minute. This is consistent with the 
intended deterrent effect of cautions.  
 
An extra yellow card received by the away (home) team previously in the match, whether in the 
immediately preceding three minutes or prior to that, is associated with increased probability of 
a home (away) team yellow card in the current minute. This result may reflect both conflict 
escalation within a match and a possible tendency for referees to ‘even up’ decisions. These 
effects are significant and similar in sign across both leagues.  
 
An extra goal scored by the home team, with away score constant, is shown to lead to a reduced 
probability of a home team yellow card in each league. It also leads to an increased probability of 
an away team yellow card though this effect is statistically significant only for the Premiership. 
The results therefore confirm that controlling for goal supremacy during the match is an 
important feature of our model.   
  17
Turning to pre-game covariates, we note that derby matches in England generate increased 
probability of cautions for each team, but this effect is absent in Germany where there are far 
fewer fixtures of intense local rivalry. Attendance is not a significant predictor of the likelihood 
of caution in either league. The lack of significance may arise from the consideration that 
increases in attendance from the mean may come from an increase in the number of either home 
or away supporters with different implications for the degree of social pressure exerted on 
referees on behalf of home teams. 
 
An increase in difference in bookmaker win probability of the home team relative to the away 
team is found to be associated with a reduced likelihood of the home team receiving a yellow 
card and a higher likelihood of an away team receiving a yellow card, in each league (for away 
teams, the positive level effect dominates the negative quadratic effect within the sample range). 
Given efficiency in the bookmaker betting market for match results, these results suggest that ex 
ante relative team strength is a significant predictor of the likelihood of cautions for the 
competing teams in a match. The greater the likely superiority of the home team, as signalled by 
betting odds, the fewer yellow cards the home team is predicted to receive and the more yellow 
cards the away team is predicted to receive. 
 
We can test for the presence of refereeing bias in the Bundesliga through the exploitation of 
information about presence of running track in stadia (Dohmen, 2005). The inclusion of the 
dummy variable track accounts for whether the crowd was or was not separated from the field of 
play by a running track. This is an irrelevant consideration for the Premiership. The results in 
Table 2 show that home teams face an increased probability of a yellow card where there is a  18
track, with a coefficient that is significant at five per cent. We also find that track has a positive, 
and marginally significant (p = 0.052) impact on home team’s probability of red cards. The 
marginality of significance may be attributed to the much lower frequency of home red cards 
relative to home yellows.  That it makes a difference whether there is a track is suggestive that 
German referees are not immune to social pressure when the crowd is in close proximity to the 
action. Referees are the likely source of what we observe here as bias since home players are, if 
anything, likely to be more aggressive if stirred up by a close-up crowd and this factor would 
tend to lead to fewer, not more, home cards being offered where there is a track. We should 
stress that this form of bias is systematically offered towards home teams and is not idiosyncratic 
to specific referees. Moreover, although we include referee fixed effects in the regressions 
reported in Tables 2 and 3, we cannot use these to ascertain existence of bias as the inferences 
will depend on the selection of the baseline referee, who may or may not be biased himself. It is 
the case that referee fixed effects are jointly significant in the regressions in Tables 2 and 3, but 
this can only be taken to imply inconsistency and not necessarily any form of systematic bias.  
 
The findings on refereeing bias in the Bundesliga here are consistent with those of Dohmen 
(2005) who examined data from independent consultants, appointed by the DFB, on correctness 
of referees’ decisions to award penalty kicks. More penalties were awarded to home teams in 
stadia without a running track. This suggests, reinforced by our result, that, given equal revenue-
generating potential, removal of running track was a rational decision by the three Bundesliga 1 
clubs that did so in our sample period. Dohmen also found that, given that an award of a penalty, 
penalty decisions were more likely to be ‘correct’ in matches played in stadia with a running 
track separating fans from pitch.   19
Behind all these findings may be that social pressure is exerted through volume of noise. Nevill 
et al. (2002) performed an experiment in which two sets of referees viewed a videotape of a 
Premiership match under different conditions and were asked to nominate award of free kicks. 
One set viewed the replay with the sound of fan noise eliminated while the other group watched 
with sound retained. The latter group offered more decisions in favour of the home team. 
 
We turn next to results based on estimation of equations (3) and (4) for probability of card issue 
to favourite and underdog teams. In this exercise, team and referee fixed effects are excluded. 
However, it should be noted that difference in bookmaker probability is retained. Of course, this 
variable is now constrained to the positive range in the case of the ‘favourite’ equation and to the 
negative range for ‘underdogs’ (since the favourite, by definition, has the higher win 
probability). Continuing to control for win probabilities is key here. As in Dawson et al., it 
should be recognised that the reason for greater incidence of yellow cards for visiting teams 
might be that typically they are underdogs and may therefore attempt to employ more foul play 
as an extra input in the absence of sufficient talent. If this is the reason for differential yellow 
card totals for home and away teams, then a visiting team that has similar prospects of victory as 
a typical home team should not face a different expected number of yellow cards from that 
typical home team. So long as we control for win probabilities in the equations for team yellow 
cards, the inclusion of a dummy variable to indicate which is the home team should not add 
significant explanatory power to the model. If the coefficient on the home team dummy were 
significant this would be evidence that there is differential treatment of home and away teams 
that could not be explained away by the correlation between home/away status and the teams’ 
prospects of winning.  20
In Tables 4 to 6, the variable home underdog distinguishes matches where the underdog is the 
team playing at home and the favourite is the team playing away. We estimate ordered probit 
models of probability of yellow card, straight red card and any red card (including second 
yellow). In Table 4, the coefficient estimate on home underdog is negative and statistically 
significant in the underdog equation for yellow cards for each league. Hence, controlling for how 
large the difference in win probabilities is as well as for within-game factors, underdog teams are 
less likely to receive yellow cards when playing at home rather than away. Similarly, for the 
Premiership (but not this time for the Bundesliga where the coefficient estimate was statistically 
insignificant), the chance of a yellow card is higher for the favourite playing away rather than at 
home. Therefore, this pattern of results clearly supports the finding in Dawson et al. (2007) that 
the tendency of away teams to receive relatively more yellow cards cannot be fully explained by 
the fact that, because of home advantage, they are more often than not the team more likely to 
win the match.           
 
From the results shown in Table 5, we observe a positive and (highly) significant coefficient on 
home underdog for probability of favourite team receiving a red card in each league. Controlling 
for degree of favourite status in the odds, match score and within-game dynamics of yellow and 
red cards, we find that favourites face a higher probability of a red card when playing away 
rather than at home. Hence, referees generally exhibit bias in their treatment of red cards in 
favour of home teams, and not just in their behaviour with respect to less severe cautionable 
offences. This finding is reinforced by the results shown in Table 6 for all red cards, including 
second yellow cards and not just straight red cards.  In each league, away teams that are 
favourites receive a significantly higher probability of a red card, of either type, when it is  21
playing away and the underdog is playing at home. For the Bundesliga only, we find that 
underdog teams have a lower probability of a red card, ceteris paribus, when they are playing at 
home. 
 
We have, then, found a number of indications of home team bias on the part of referees in both 
Germany and England. This may be a source of concern to the respective governing bodies. 
However, it cannot be assumed that neutrality would be socially preferable to any given degree 
of home team bias. If referees indeed exhibit systematic bias towards home teams, then this may 
help reinforce home advantage and help smaller teams win more home games. This may in turn 
raise competitive balance which is alleged by many sports economists to raise audience interest 
in the competition. Assuming that reluctance to issue cautions to home teams has a bearing on 




We have presented a novel disaggregated analysis of bias and favouritism practiced by soccer 
referees, in which the unit of observation is minute of play in a match. This disaggregated 
approach allows us to control for within-game factors of fluctuating scores and dynamics of 
award of cards in a match. With these additional controls in place, inferences on bias and 
favouritism are more robust and more compelling than those derived from analyses that use the 
match as unit of observation. It appears, though, that the previous literature, such as Dawson et 
al. (2007) and Dohmen (2005), was correct in detecting signs of bias in application of 
disciplinary sanctions in English and German football.   22
 
We have two primary exhibits for referee bias in favour of home teams in the award of yellow 
and red cards: 
•  From the Bundesliga we find evidence of favouritism against away teams in that home 
teams playing in stadia without running tracks have lower probabilities of yellow and red 
card than home teams playing in grounds without running tracks. This is indicative of a 
successful impact of fans’ ‘social pressure’ as proposed by Dohmen (2005). The fact that 
three teams switched stadium design with track removal in our sample period suggests 
that this is more than just a specific team effect. 
•  When matches in our two sample leagues are re-specified as favourite versus underdog, 
rather than home versus away, we obtain evidence, via significant coefficients on the 
home underdog dummy variable, of biased treatment of teams in both the Premiership 
and the Bundesliga, in the award of both yellow and red cards. 
 
Clearly, it would be desirable to assess whether our results are supported by analysis from other 
European football leagues, and other sports leagues where sanction design and refereeing 
technology may differ. Most importantly, further research is needed to assess the implications of 
referee bias for league design and corporate governance of sports leagues. Is the bias that we 
have detected harmful to stakeholders in the sport? Are audiences (at the stadium and in front of 
television sets) deterred both by increased sanctions applied by referees and referee bias in these 
sanctions? And what exactly are the impacts of measures to reduce referee bias on match 
uncertainty of outcome and competitive balance in football leagues?  These are deeper research  23
questions that demand attention. For now, the strong findings of referee favouritism towards 























Allen, W.D. (2002), Crime, punishment and recidivism: Lessons from the National Hockey 
League, Journal of Sports Economics, 3, 39-60. 
 
Boyko, R. Boyko, A. and M. Boyko (2007), Referee bias contributes to home advantage in 
English Premiership football, Journal of Sports Sciences, 25.  
 
Brandes, L. and E. Franck (2007), Spending too much on a good thing already? How less 
uncertainty of outcome would foster fan demand, mimeo, University of Zurich. 
 
Caliendo, M. and D. Radic (2006), Ten do it better, do they? An empirical analysis of an old 
football myth, IZA Discussion Paper No. 2158. 
 
Carmichael, F. and D. Thomas (2005), Home-field effect and team performance: Evidence from 
English Premiership football, Journal of Sports Economics, 6, 264-281. 
 
Dawson, P., Dobson, S., Goddard, J. and J. Wilson (2007), Are football referees really biased 
and inconsistent? Evidence from the English Premier League, Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Society, Series A, forthcoming. 
 
Dohmen, T. (2005), Social pressure influences decisions of individuals: Evidence from the 
behavior of football referees, IZA Discussion Paper No. 1595. 
 
Forrest, D. and R. Simmons (2002), Outcome uncertainty and attendance demand in sport: The 
case of English soccer, The Statistician, 51, 229-241. 
 
Forrest, D. and R. Simmons (2004), Sentiment in the soccer betting market, University of 
Salford, mimeo. 
 
Frick, B. and J. Prinz (2007), Monitoring the monitor: Performance evaluation and remuneration 
of professional referees in German professional soccer, University of Witten/Herdecke, mimeo. 
 
Garicano, L. and I. Palacios-Huerta (2006), Sabotage in tournaments: Making the beautiful game 
less beautiful, mimeo, University of Chicago. 
 
Garicano, L., Palacios-Huerta, I. and C. Prendergast (2005), Favoritism under social pressure, 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 87, 208-216. 
 
Heckelman, J. and Yates, A. (2003), And a hockey game broke out: Crime and punishment in the 
NHL, Economic Inquiry, 41, 705-712. 
 
Levitt, S. (2002), Testing the economic model of crime: the National Hockey League’s two-
referee experiment, Berkeley Electronic Journals in Economic Analysis and Policy, 1, 1-19. 
  25
Lucey, B. and D. Power (2004), Do soccer referees display home team favouritism?, mimeo, 
Trinity College Dublin.    
 
Nevill, A., Balmer, N. and A. Williams (2002), The influence of crowd noise and experience 
upon refereeing decisions in football, Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 3, 261-272. 
  
Pollard, R. and G. Pollard (2005), Long-term trends in home advantage in professional team 
sports in North America and England (1876-2003), Journal of Sports Sciences, 23, 337-350. 
 
Rickman, N. and R. Witt (2005), Favouritism and financial incentives: A natural experiment, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 4968. 
 
Ridder, G., Cramer, J. and P. Hopstaken (1994), Down to ten: Estimating the effect of a red card 
in soccer, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 89, 1124-1127. 
 
Stefani, R. (2007), Measurement and interpretation of home advantage, in J. Albert and R. 
Koning (eds.), Statistical thinking in sports, CRC Press, 203-216.  
 
Sutter, M. and M. Kocher (2004), Favouritism of agents- the case of referees’ home bias, Journal 
of Economic Psychology, 25, 461-469. 
 
Torgler, B. (2004), The economics of the FIFA football World Cup, Kyklos, 57, 287-300. 
 
Witt, R. (2005), Do players react to sanction changes? Evidence from the English Premier 






















Table 1a  Referees’ awards of cards per game in Bundesliga 1 
 














Albrecht 59  1.92  2.34  0.051  0.034  0.034  0.034 
Aust 47  1.87  2.23  0.021  0.106  0.021  0.043 
Berg 32  1.44  1.88  0 0  0  0 
Brych 32  1.78  1.84  0.031  0.031  0  0.031 
Fandel 124  1.79  2.23  0.032  0.113  0.040  0.048 
Fleischer 83 1.93  1.98  0.024 0.036  0.060  0.048 
Frohlich 81  1.77  2.02  0.037  0.049  0.062  0.111 
Gagelmann 63  2.08  2.51  0.048  0.095  0.063  0.032 
Grafe 30  2.07  2.13  0.067  0.033  0.033  0.100 
Jansen 61  1.52  2.05  0.016  0.066  0.066  0.016 
Kemmling 60  1.72 2.40  0.067  0.100 0.083 0.117 
Kessler 53  1.83  2.26  0.019  0.057  0.057  0.151 
Kinhofer 57  2.26  2.46  0.035  0.053  0  0.070 
Kircher 70  1.61  1.89 0  0  0  0.043 
Koop 33  1.70  2.33  0.061  0.121  0  0.061 
Krug 68  1.75  2.26  0.029  0.074  0.044  0.074 
Merk 135  1.67  2.17  0.030  0.044  0.059  0.074 
Meyer 94  2.10  2.37  0.032  0.011  0.064  0.106 
Sippel 73  1.74  1.90  0.014  0.027  0.014  0.082 
Stark 100  1.65  2.32  0.030  0.080  0.030  0.080 
Steinborn 60 1.38  1.75 0.017 0.017  0  0.050 
Strampe 47  1.47  2.11  0.021  0.191  0.085  0.064 
Wack 97  1.84  2.19  0.031  0.062  0.031  0.052 
Wagner 83  1.49  2.14 0  0.072  0.072  0.048 
Weiner 85  1.95  2.36  0.012  0.118  0.012  0.082 
Mean 69  1.77  2.16  0.029  0.064  0.037  0.065 
 


















Table 1b  Referees’ awards of cards per game in Premiership 
 














Barber 81  1.51  2.00  0.049  0.062  0.037  0.049 
Barry 96  1.07  1.68  0  0.031  0.042  0.042 
Bennett 132  1.43  1.89  0.038  0.114  0.045  0.068 
Clattenburg 33  1.73  1.45  0.030  0.030  0.030  0 
Dean 108  1.54  1.74  0.019  0.028  0.056  0.093 
Dowd 79  1.59  2.08  0.025  0.076  0.038  0.101 
Dunn 99  1.20  1.56  0  0.030  0.030  0.040 
Durkin 88  0.92  1.26  0.023  0.011  0  0.057 
D’Urso 98  1.29  1.90  0.061  0.082  0.071  0.061 
Elleray 55  1.05  1.64  0  0  0.073  0.109 
Foy 57  1.04  1.63  0.018  0.070  0.035  0.018 
Gallagher 112 1.11 1.50 0.045  0.063 0.027 0.054 
Halsey 129  0.91  1.43  0.016  0.008  0.078  0.047 
Jones 30  1.47  1.87  0  0.033  0.067  0 
Knight 63  1.22  1.81  0.016  0.032  0.159  0.079 
Messias 45  1.38  1.93  0.044  0.044 0 0.044 
Poll 155  1.36  1.66  0.045  0.052  0.032  0.026 
Rennie 93  1.23  1.18  0.011 0  0  0.075 
Riley 132  1.60  2.16  0.045  0.061  0.091  0.053 
Styles 128  1.45  1.94  0.047  0.094  0.094  0.055 
Walton 34  1.21  1.53 0  0  0.029  0.029 
Webb 61  1.21  1.67  0  0.033  0.049  0.049 
Wiley 140  1.41  1.59  0.043  0.029  0.007  0.057 
Wilkes 29  1.24  2.14  0 0.034  0.069  0.069 
Winter 83  0.80  1.57  0 0.048  0.012  0.012 
Mean 86  1.28  1.71  0.023  0.043  0.047  0.051 
 
 
























Within-game        


































































































Pre-game      












































N  159,210 159,210 204,480 204,480 
LL  -32929 -32929 -32871 -32871 
Note: Dependent variable is probability of team receiving a yellow card in a given minute. Coefficients are reported 
with t-statistics in parentheses, computed using robust standard errors clustered by match. Equations are estimated 
jointly for home and away teams but separately for Bundesliga and Premiership. Models in Tables 2 and 3 include 
fixed effects for referees and home and away teams and year dummies.   29
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N  159,210 159,210 204,480 204,480 
LL  -1354 -1354 -1669 -1669  30
 









Within-game        
























































































































Pre-game      




























N  159,750 159,750 198,180 198,180 
LL  -32581 -32581 -32035 -32035 
Note: Dependent variable in Tables 4-6 is probability of team receiving a stated card in a given minute. Coefficients 
are reported with t-statistics in parentheses, computed using robust standard errors clustered by match. Equations are 
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N  159,750 159,750 198,180 198,180 







Table 6 Bivariate probit model of red card (including 2
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N  159,750 159,750 198,180 198,180 
LL  -5332 -5332 -6824 -6824 
 